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The Reinvigoration of the Doctrine of

'Implied Repeals:' A Requiem for
Indigenous Treaty Rights

by DAVID E. WILKINS*

INTRODUCTION

America's indigenous nations occupy a distinctive political/
tus within the United States as separate sovereigns whose righ
in the doctrine of inherent tribal sovereignty, affirmed in hund
fied treaties and agreements, acknowledged in the Commerce

the U.S. Constitution, and recognized in ample federal leg

case law. Ironically, while indigenous sovereignty is neither co
ally defined or delimited, it may be restricted or enhanced by
One could argue, then, that indeterminacy or inconsistencyl is
of the tribal-federal political/legal relationship.
THE POWER TO ABROGATE INDIAN TREATIES:

CONGRESS OR THE COURTS?

Much scholarly attention has focused on the question

prompted and serves to perpetuate this indeterminacy. That i
the federal government been unable to maintain a consistent po
tation either favoring the breakup of tribes and the assimilation

*David E. Wilkins, a member of the Lumbee Nation, is an Associate Professor of
American Indian Studies, Political Science and Law at the University of Minnesota/Twin

Cities. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of North

Carolina/Chapel Hill, in 1990.

1. Evidence of federal indeterminacy in how to administer Indian tribes and their members is abundant. For example, are tribes "distinct, independent communities" capable of
exercising a measure of external sovereign power (Worcester v. Georgia 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
515 (1832) and Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711 (1835), or are they merely
"domestic-dependent nations" limited to wielding a reduced degree of internal sovereignty
(Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831)?
Do tribal nations enjoy a uniquely "political" relationship with the federal government
(Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), or is their relationship with the U.S. based on
majority-minority race relations theory (See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.)
567 (1846), United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278 (1909), and United States v. Nice, 241
U.S. 591 (1916)?
Or, are general acts of Congress inapplicable to tribes unless they are specifically written
into the legislation (Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 100 (1884), or are tribes subject to congressional enactments unless they are specifically exempted (The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 (11
Wall.) 616 (1871)?
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or respecting tribal national sovereignty.2 This is a weighty a
hensive political, legal, economic, geographical, and moral qu
will not answer it here. My attention is narrower and more in
focused. I am specifically interested in understanding the role
Supreme Court in its efforts to quash or dramatically modify
rights without congressional authorization or tribal consent. T
this essay proposes to answer is this: Does the power to abro
nate, or modify Indian treaties/agreements rest solely with
branches-that is, with Congress or the President-or does the
Court have the constitutional right to "impliedly" abrogate Ind
I argue, and the evidence bears out, that the power to ab
modify Indian treaties (or agreements), or provisions of these
may only be exercised by the Congress3 and then only after th
branch has expressly and unequivocally stated its intent to alt

the diplomatic arrangement between the U.S. and a parti
nation. I contend that when the Supreme Court hands do

which impliedly sever specific Indian treaty rights, and does
specific legislative mandate directing the termination of the t
that the Court has vastly overstepped its juridical power, is v
federal Constitution, and is acting contrary to the acknowledge
tionship4 to tribes which holds that the U.S. has not only th

2. See Vine Deloria, Jr., and Clifford M. Lytle's, The Nations Within:
Future of American Indian Sovereignty, with Clifford M. Lytle (New Y
Books, 1984); Nell Jessup Newton, "Let A Thousand Policy-Flowers Bloom:
Policy in the Twenty-First Century," Arkansas Law Review, vol. 46 (19

Joanne Nagel, American Indian Ethnic Renewal: Red Power and the Resurgenc
and Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

3. In Minnesota v. Mille Lac Band of Chippewa Indians (119 S.Ct. 1187), h

March 24, 1999, the Court in a 5-4 ruling upheld the Chippewa's 1837 treaty
fish, and gather on 13 million acres of land the eight Chippewa Bands ceded
government in central Minnesota. In upholding these treaty rights, Justice O'C
ed that "Congress may abrogate Indian treaty rights, but it must clearly expr

do so." Quoting from United States v. Dion (1986), O'Connor stated that "

clear evidence that Congress actually considered the conflict between its inte
the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve that c

gating the treaty." There is," said O'Connor, "no such 'clear evidence' of
intent to abrogate the Chippewa Treaty rights here."

4. I agree with the definition of trust which holds that the federal governme

legal and moral obligation to protect Indian lands, waters, minerals, and al
resources and is also obligated to protect and encourage tribal self-governmen
tribes in their movement towards economic independence, and to provide

and services to raise the standard of living of Indian people to a level compara

majority enjoys (See, U.S. Congress, American Indian Policy Review Comm
Report, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977): p.

relationship, however, is not and cannot be not uniform across tribes. No tw
enjoy the exact same relationship with the federal government because of var

around when and why a tribe first established its political relationship w

power (typically Spain, France, or Great Britain) or with the United States; wh
strengths or weaknesses of the tribal nation were at the time it negotiated its
whether these shifted across time; and in whether or not a treaty basis exists
parties.
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moral duty to assist tribes by protecting
ty, and cultural heritage.

The judicial doctrine of implied repe
arrangements is an invalid and unwarra
tioned by the Constitution or the distin
tribes and the federal government. Even

between a preexisting treaty right an

statute, the courts, because of the trust
must, in the absence of a specific repeali
the federal government's treaty obligati

the Supreme Court in sorting out all

between treaty provisions and statutory
treaty and to interpret the statute in con
the treaty was negotiated.
WHAT IS IMPLIED REPEAL?

(A.K.A. REPEAL BY IMPLICATION)
By "implied" I mean an action by the court when the intention in
regard to the subject matter is not manifested by explicit and direct words,
but is gathered by implication or deduction from the circumstances, the
general language, or the conduct of one or both of the parties. By "repeal"
I mean the abrogation of a previously existing law or treaty by another
measure that contains provisions perceived to be so contrary to or irreconcilable with those of the earlier law that only one of the two can stand in
force. The conjunction of the two terms leads to a definition of implied
repeal which means the superseding of an existing law, rule, or treaty provision without an express directive to that effect.
This doctrine is of critical importance for tribal nations whose collective sovereign rights and some individual Indian rights generally hinge
on treaties. This issue also is significant for American democracy because
it raises questions of non-discrimination, consent, and self-determination,
as well as justice, fairness, and respect for the rule of law. And any discussion of implied repeals of necessity warrants some discussion of how
the courts ascertain congressional intent. This is an especially salient point
for federal Indian policy because Congress, via the Commerce Clause, has
exclusive constitutional authority to regulate the federal government's

affairs with tribes.

The political/legal doctrine of "good faith," a close corollary to the
trust doctrine, first articulated by the Congress in the 1787 Northwest
Ordinance, succinctly states that the federal government would always
observe "the utmost good faith towards the Indians, their lands and property shall never be taken from them without their consent; and in their
property, rights and liberty, they never shall be invaded or disturbed,

unless in just the lawful wars authorised [sic] by Congress; but laws
founded in justice and humanity shall from time to time be made for pre-
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venting wrongs being done to them, and for preserving peace
ship with them .... "5
Any sovereign nation retains the power to unilaterally a
treaty commitments, although since treaties are diplomatic ar
between two or more nations, formal unilateral abrogations oc
realization that the result might be a declaration of war by the o
signatories or international embarrassment before the family o
the case of the U.S., the congressional power to abrogate, as
and Volkman rightly noted,6 "is based on the notion that a tr
sents the political policy of the nation at the time it was made.
change of circumstances and the national interest accordingly
modification of its terms, then Congress may abrogate a treaty
in part."7
While agreeing that treaties are political arrangements which may be
abrogated by either treaty party, and specifically that from the federal
government's perspective it falls to Congress to be the nullifying agent, I
disagree with Wilkinson and Volkman's later contention that "[t]here are
so many tests for determining whether an abrogation has been effected,
and most of them are so vague, that a court has little recourse but to arrive
at an ad hoc, almost arbitrary decision when faced with the question of
whether a particular treaty guarantee has been abrogated by Congress."8
Wilkinson and Volkman vest in the Supreme Court an amount of
political power and policymaking leeway not authorized by Article III of
the U.S. Constitution, which contradicts much prior judicial precedent, is
contrary to the doctrine of tribal sovereignty, and which directly opposes
federal Indian policy which recognizes that Congress has the exclusive
authority to regulate the federal government's affairs with tribes, including the power to alter the nation's will-as evidenced in treaties-towards
tribes. Furthermore, since Congress is the principal agent responsible for

overseeing the United States' exercise of its trust obligations towards
tribes, in the event that the trust is to be terminated or modified it falls to

the legislative branch, not the judicial branch, to make such alterations.
I believe this position is defensible throughout the history of treaty
relations between the U.S. and tribes, but that it was made more com-

pelling after 18719 when Congress unilaterally stopped negotiating
treaties with tribes, thus precluding Indian nations, who remained outside
the U.S. Constitution's pale, from that important form of negotiation. And
since tribes, qua tribes, lack congressional representation, and tribal rights
are based largely on inherent sovereignty and treaties/agreements, and are
5. 1 Stat., 50.

6. "Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: 'As Long as Water Flows, or Grass

Grows Upon the Earth'-How Long a Time is That?" California Law Review, vol. 63

(1975): 601-61.

7. Ibid., p. 604.
8. Ibid., p. 608.
9. 16 Stat., 544, 566.
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not grounded in the U.S. Constitution, t
courts to uphold the extant treaty righ
directive to the contrary or a mutually
tribe and the U.S. to modify the basis of

Finally, American Indians gradually became naturalized as

American citizens (both state and federal, which were layered onto their

tribal citizenship) via treaty provisions, land allotments, and specific
statutory measures. This layering of multiple citizenships, in conjunction
with the ongoing federal trust doctrine, meant that a congressional decision to unilaterally abrogate Indian treaty rights would normally occur
only in the event of compelling national reasons (i.e., Indian land cessions

for the expanding Euro-American presence) and sometimes with the

direct concurrence of a tribe. The Supreme Court, charged, among other
things, with upholding the Constitution, the laws, and "all treaties made"
as the supreme law of the land, is required to closely examine any conflicts and finding no direct congressional intent to abrogate an Indian
treaty should not presume it has the authority to impliedly repeal the
same.

The policies of tribal self-determination10 and self-g

inaugurated in the early 1970s and continuing into t

toward a federal policy orientation bent on recognizing
eign cultural, political, and economic rights of tribal nati
with an increasingly greater measure of political indepen
firm evidence, however, that since the late 1980s, as the
Supreme Court turned more conservative, it has veered
congressional policy of tribal self-determination and is re
that harken back to the nineteenth-century policy of over

acculturation.12 And since the ascendance of the Repu

power in both houses of Congress in 1994, the Congress
more conservative. Legislative conservatism, augmented b

ideology of states' rights, threatens tribal economic g

development, and social progress as tribes have to compet

a share of federal dollars, or, in some cases, tribal go

required to seek funding directly from states when Con
funds for certain programs to the states under block gra
tribal situation is more precarious in the 1990s because tr
tive and judicial assaults on their treaty rights.
10. 88 St. 2203.

11. 108 St. 4250, see, especially Title II "Self-Governance."

12. See, e.g., Frank Pommersheim, Braids of Feathers (Berkeley: University o

California Press, 1995); and David E. Wilkins, American Indian Sovereignty and the U.S
Supreme Court: The Masking of Justice (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1997). But see
Minnesota v. Mille Lac Band of Chippewa Indians (119 S.Ct. 1187 (1999) and Puget Sound
Shellfish Growers v. United States (1999 U.S. Lexis 2504) (1999), two decisions which
upheld the treaty rights of tribes in Minnesota and Washington State.

13. David E. Wilkins, "GOP May Railroad Indian Interests," Arizona Daily Star

(November 27, 1994), sec. f, p. 2.
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POLICYMAKING BY THE SUPREME COURT:

MAJORITY OR JUSTICE

The issue of the Supreme Court's policymaking role was argue

well by Robert Dahl, a political scientist, in a classic article written near
forty years ago.14 Dahl asserted that in determining the extent to whic
the Supreme Court makes policy decisions, it is important to understa
whether the Court goes outside established "legal" criteria found in pa
precedent, statutes, and the Constitution. In this respect, the Supreme
Court occupies a distinctive position because it is an important character
istic of the Supreme Court that on occasion its members are required t
render decisions "where legal criteria are not in any realistic sense ade
quate to the task."15 In other words, cases sometimes come before the
Court involving alternatives about which there are profound disagreements in society-abortion, desegregation, drug use and regulation, crimi
nal and victims' rights, religious issues-that is to say, the setting of th
case is clearly "political."
Historically, this was certainly true of Indian issues. The Court ha
occasionally acted contrary to congressional policy, administrative dire
tion, and public sentiment in rendering Indian law decisions. Examples
are Worcester v. Georgial6 (1832-State law is inferior to Indian treaty

law), Ex parte Crow Dogl7 (1883-tribes have criminal jurisdiction ov

their own members), Matter of Heffl8 (1905-Indians who become natu
ralized as American citizens have the right to drink liquor), and Choate
Trappl9 (1912)-Indian allottees are exempt from state taxation), to nam
but a few. Nevertheless, in the area of treaty abrogation, I argue that th
Supreme Court exceeds its constitutional authority when it relies on t
doctrine of implied repeal to explicitly abrogate Indian treaty rights sin
a treaty is a formal political arrangement between two or more sovereig
entities. They are negotiated by designated individuals and ratified by t
nations of the participatory powers. Hence, as political agreements, it fo
lows that the power to abrogate should be wielded solely by the branc
constitutionally empowered to act.
In determining the role of the Court, Dahl argued that two very
different, conflicting criteria are sometimes used. These are the majorit
criterion and the criterion of right or justice. The majority criterion ref
to the fact that every conflict in society invariably is a dispute between
majority of those eligible to participate and a minority or minorities,
else it is a dispute between or among minorities only. Thus the outcom

14. "Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker
Journal of Public Law, vol. 6 (1957): 279-295.
15. Ibid., p. 280.

16. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
17. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
18. 197 U.S. 488 (1905).
19. 224 U.S. 665 (1912).
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of the court's decisions must either (1)
minority--counter to those of a majority
of a majority--counter to those of a min
erences of one minority, counter to anoth

For example, Dahl discussed the po

Court's primary role is to protect the righ

ny of the majority. His analysis of data

Court declared portions of federal leg

1950s, however, showed that, in fact, "

Court are never for long out of line

among the lawmaking majorities of the U
In other words, Dahl found that "the e
the Court has protected fundamental or
the tyranny of some lawmakers. Of cou
later show,22 Dahl's article was written d
repression (e.g., fear of communism) an
settled in and begun to render decisions
minorities against tyrannical or indiffer

ly chided Dahl for his exclusion of d

involving statutory construction or cases
islation-and for his reliance on a policy
influence or power. This winners and lo

"imposes an artificial distinction tha

which even 'losers' contribute importan
emerge."23 Nevertheless, although Casp

central flaws in Dahl's arguments and

larger thesis and an emphasis on his seco

still has merit.

The criterion of right or justice, acco
most important policy function of the C

considered basic or fundamental. The

assumes an underlying fundamental body
Court guarantees by its decisions. Dahl
transitional periods, the Supreme Court w
nant national alliance and generally sup
alliance. The main task of the Court, he
the fundamental policies of the political
on the basic patterns of behavior required
Dahl recognized, and the evidence viv
not simply an agent of the dominant ru
Court has real power bases of its own, th
20. Ibid., p. 281-282.
21. Ibid., p. 285.

22. "The Supreme Court and National Policy

Review, vol. 70, no. 1 (March 1976): 50-63.

23. Ibid., p. 62.
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distinctive legitimacy extended to the court's interpretatio

Constitution. The evidence in Indian law bears out this claim. There are

more than a few cases, which Dahl would categorize as justice cases, in
which the Supreme Court has rendered powerful rulings supporting tribal
rights and sovereignty, even when the exercise of that sovereignty clashes
with majority sentiment.24
However, when analyzing the entire history of the court, on balance,

one finds that the bulk of the law pronounced by the court, as Shattuck
and Norgren put it, "has not been 'a better way' for Indians."25 While noting Indian legal gains, they found that those gains "are never final nor are
they secure from political manipulation."26
The Rehnquist Court is openly supportive of the major-majoritari-

an-policies of the dominant national alliance, policies which generally
do not reflect positively on the distinctive extraconstitutional role of tribes
in the American polity. The Rehnquist Court, at least insofar as tribes are
concerned, has adopted the majority criterion as its major policy perspective, and relies much less on the justice criterion when it decides to hear
Indian related cases. The reinvigorated doctrine of implied repeal bears
this out.

THE COURT AND "POLITICAL" QUESTIONS

Under Article 3, section 2, of the U.S. Constitution, the Supreme
Court's power is said to extend to "all cases, in law and equity, arising
under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or

which shall be made, under their authority ... " Despite this seemingly
clear authority to hear cases involving treaties, the Supreme Court has frequently declined to rule on matters involving treaties by claiming that
those agreements were "political questions" that should be resolved by the
political branches. The political question doctrine means what the justices
say it means. The doctrine originated in Marbury v. Madison (5 U.S. 137
(1803)), when Chief Justice Marshall said that "the province of the Court

is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals. . ... Questions in their
nature political, or which are, by the Constitution and laws, submitted to
the executive can never be made in this Court."27 Similarly, as the court
held in The Chinese Exclusion Cases (130 U.S. 581 (1889)), "the question
whether our government is justified in disregarding its engagements with
another nation is not one of determination of the courts" (p. 602).
Additional rulings have elaborated on other reasons for the political
24. See, e.g., Worcester (1832), Crow Dog (1883), and Choate v. Trapp (1912).
25. Petra T. Shattuck and Jill Norgren, Partial Justice: Federal Indian Law in a Liberal
Constitution System (Providence, R.I.: Berg Publishers, 1991): 197.
26. Ibid.

27. Quoted in David M. O'Brien's Constitutional Law and Politics: Struggle for Power
and Governmental Accountability, 2nd ed. Vol. I (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1995
114.
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question, besides deference to the political
lacks information and resources needed to make an informed decision.

And in some areas, especially foreign policy and international relations,
the court lacks appropriate standards for resolving disputes or the means

to enforce its decision.28

In federal Indian affairs, however, the Supreme Court has used the
political question doctrine in many cases,29 often in conjunction with the

congressional plenary power doctrine,30 to either restrict or disavow

Indian rights and in some cases to even deny Indians a legal venue to have
their grievances heard. The political question doctrine, first used expressly
in Indian law in U.S. v. Rogers,31 was used most frequently during the
allotment and assimilation years from the 1880s to the early 1920s, when
the court was most deferential to the legislature and when the federal government used a frontal and unabashed assault in an effort to Americanize
native peoples.

It was clear during the treaty making period-1778-1868-that
Indian affairs, like foreign affairs, had been constitutionally delegated to
Congress. Thus the power of judicial review was constrained to a similar

extent as judicial power to review foreign affairs decisions were constrained, so that "the federal government's power to make treaties with
the Indians was considered a political question, beyond judicial examination."32 So long as tribes remained largely independent and were dealt
with as sovereigns via treaty making, the federal government's largely
28. Ibid., p. 115.

29. See, e.g., U.S. v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407 (1866); U.S. v. Old Settlers, 148
U.S. 427 (1893); Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445 (1899); Cherokee Nation v.
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (1902); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); U.S. v.
Rickert, 188 U.S. 432 (1903); Blackfeather v. U.S., 190 U.S. 368 (1903); Matter of Heff, 197
U.S. 488 (1905); U.S. v. Hitchcock, 205 U.S. 80 (1907); Tiger v. Western Investment Co.,

221 U.S. 286 (1911); U.S. v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913); Johnson v. Gearlds, 234 U.S.
422 (1914); U.S. v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916); U.S. v. Waller, 243 U.S. 452 (1917); Brader
v. James, 246 U.S. 88 (1918); and U.S. v. Boylan, 265 Fed. 165 (1920).
30. See, e.g., David E. Wilkins, "The U.S. Supreme Court's Explication of 'Federal

Plenary Power,"' American Indian Quarterly, vol. 18, no. 3 (Summer 1994): 349-368 for an
analysis of this important and variegated term. In general it has three broad meanings: exclusive, preemptive, and unlimited-absolute. In Indian affairs, particularly during the period
from the 1880s to the 1920s and later during the termination era of the 1950s and 1960s, it

was usually defined as a congressional power which lacked any constitutional constraints.
Congress, in short, had virtually unlimited authority to do whatever it wanted regarding tribal lands, resources, or political rights.

31. 45 U.S. 567 (1846).

32. Shattuck and Norgren, Partial Justice (1991): 123. Generally, this is accurate.
However, I would suggest that even during this long period there was a qualitative difference in the way Congress dealt with tribes versus its dealings in foreign affairs. This has to
do with the unique political relationship that had already evolved, rooted in the political doctrines of consent, good faith, and trust, as laid out in congressional policy pronouncements,

supreme court cases like the Cherokee cases (Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 1831 and
Worcester v. Georgia, 1832), and presidential proclamations and annual messages in which
the chief executive often acknowledged the federal government's moral obligations to pro-

tect tribes.
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unreviewable power to deal with tribes was justified.
However, when treaty making with tribes terminated in 18
Indian nations began to be treated as domestic national entities,
federal government bent on the allotment, the assimilation, and t
tianization of tribal persons; and as individual Indians were natur
American citizens, then the Court should have altered its stance
tribes and individual Indians and strictly scrutinized congressiona

ties regarding Indians. This should have been the case especia

those activities resulted in violations of Indian treaty rights. The
the contrary, continued its extreme deference to the political bra
frequently cited the political question doctrine as justification w

chose to ignore what for tribes were substantive federal vio

Indian rights.33

Examples of judicial deference in Indian affairs abound. In T
v. Gay (169 U.S. 264 (1897), the Court said, "it is well settled tha
of Congress may supersede a prior treaty and that any questions
arise are beyond the sphere of judicial cognizance, and must be me
political department of the Government." And in the most famou
be discussed in more detail later, which spliced the political quest

trine with the plenary power doctrine, Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,34 th

declared that Congress's plenary power vis-i-vis tribes "has alwa
deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicia
ment of the government," and that regardless of the manner i

Congress dealt with tribes, "[i]n any event, as Congress posse

power in the matter, the judiciary cannot question or inquire in
motives which prompted the enactment of this legislation."35
The Supreme Court placed some limitation on the congressio
nary power doctrine in the 1914 decision, Perrin v. United Stat
establishing the "pure arbitrariness" test. The Court, while affirm
Congress had tremendous authority over Indian affairs, neverthe
ed that "[a]s the power is incident only to the presence of the In
their status as wards of the Government, it must be conceded th

not go beyond what is reasonably essential for their protection,
to be effective, its exercise must not be purely arbitrary but foun
some reasonable basis."37
33. See, e.g., Nell Jessup Newton, "Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and
Limitation," University of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 132 (1984): 195-288 for a good
analysis of the relationship between the Supreme Court and the Congress. The Rehnquist
Court generally is less deferential to the Congress than its predecessors in many areas of
law, including Indian affairs, and has actually challenged Congress' presumption of commerce power especially as it relates-or is seen as interfering with the rights of states to control their affairs. Nevertheless, in Indian affairs, there remains a presumption on the part of
the Court that the federal government, and particularly the Congress, has superior standing
in relation to tribes and may act accordingly.

34. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
35. Ibid., p. 568.
36. 232 U.S. 478.

37. Ibid., p. 486.

This content downloaded from 141.166.178.205 on Tue, 03 Dec 2019 19:43:31 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

1999 INDIGENOUS TREATY RIGHTS 11

The political question doctrine, how

largely unrestricted legal doctrine until it
tieth century cases: Delaware Tribal Busi
United States v. Sioux Nation.39 In Weeks
congressional power over Indian propert
render legislative acts not subject to judic
a case with important repercussions for
question doctrine was swept away as a le
rely on to deny Indians a legal forum. A
"the doctrine was expressly laid to rest
sumption of congressional good faith has
ing principle for deciding questions of th
The Supreme Court, then, has the consti
Indian treaty rights, and should be availa
ed Indian tribes or tribal members can ta
The Supreme Courts does not, however, h
to explicitly, and certainly does not have
gate those rights. The power of abrogatio
JUDICIAL POWER AND IMPLIED REPEALS

The Supreme Court has never asserted that it has the power expr
ly to abrogate treaty rights. The court has instead consistently recog
that only the political branches may modify or abrogate treaty righ
was said in U.S. v. Old Settlers41 in 1893, "unquestionably a treaty m
be modified or abrogated by an Act of Congress, but the power to
and unmake is essentially political and not judicial .. ." (p. 468). Thu

the court lacks this greater, overt power, which it has recogniz

belonging solely to Congress, on what legitimate basis can it assert t
has the lesser power to abrogate treaty rights by implication? Treaty
pretation, the art of deciding the meaning of language, which the cou
the power to do, is one thing; treaty abrogation is a whole different ma

However, since the 1871 Supreme Court case The Cherokee

Tobacco,42 the court has at times acted to abrogate expressed Indian t
rights without specific authorization by the Congress. In The Chero

Tobacco, Justice Swayne pitted the 10th article of the 1866 Che
Treaty with the United States against a section of the 1868 Gen

Revenue law. He read in a congressional intent to abrogate the treaty
that was nowhere expressly stated.
Article 10 stated that Cherokee citizens had the right to sell an
product or merchandise without having to pay "any tax thereon whi
38. 430 U.S. 73, 83-85 (1977).
39. 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
40. Ibid., p. 414-415.
41. 148 U.S. 427.
42. 11 Wall. 616.
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now or may be levied by the United States on the quantity sold ou
the Indian Territory."43 The provision of the General Revenue la
contrast, imposed taxes on liquor and tobacco products "produced

where within the exterior boundaries of the United States."44 While there

was no language in the revenue law or in the accompanying documentary
record expressly or impliedly stating that this law would apply to Indian
Country, Justice Swayne, speaking for a deeply divided court (3 justices
concurred, 2 dissented, and 3 did not participate), said that the case came

down to which of the two laws was superior. Swayne maintained that
"undoubtedly one or the other must yield" since "the repugnancy is clear
and they cannot stand together" (p. 620).
Swayne went on to enunciate the infamous "last-in-time" principle,

which has troubled tribes ever since. He observed that although the

Constitution lacks language that might settle an alleged conflict between a
treaty and a statute, it was clear to the court that "the question is not
involved in any doubt as to its proper selection. A treaty may supersede a
prior act of Congress and an act of Congress may supersede a prior treaty"

(p. 621). This statement has proven to be a most disastrous legal rule.
Two months earlier, in March 1871, Congress had attached a rider to an
Indian Appropriation Act that squelched the Indian treaty process.45 With
treaty-making terminated (although agreements continued to be made
until the early 1900s), any act of Congress passed subsequent to March
1871 could be interpreted as having overriden a preexisting Indian treaty
right. Tribes were frozen in political limbo. They were no longer recognized as nations capable of formally treating with the federal government,
yet they remained separate non-constitutional political entities.
Justices Bradley and Davis noted, however, in a spirited dissent that
Indian populations were to be treated as "autonomies" and, that being the
case, "all laws of a general character passed by Congress will be consid-

ered as not applying to the Indian territory, unless expressly men-

tioned."46 The dissenting justices maintained that this was true because
"an expressed law [like a treaty right to be exempt from taxation] creating
certain rights and privileges is held never to be repealed by implication by
any subsequent law couched in general terms nor by any expressed repeal
of all laws inconsistent with such general law, unless the language be such
as clearly to indicate intention of the legislature to reflect such a repeal."47
Another decision which drew upon the implied repeal doctrine was
the egregious ruling, Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock.48 This opinion holds great
significance for federal Indian law because, among its precedents, it held

1) that congressional plenary power had always been present and that
43. 14 Stat., 799.
44. 15 Stat., 167.
45. 16 St. 544, 566.

46. Ibid., p. 622.
47. Ibid.
48. 187 U.S. 553.
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Congress' power over tribal property was
could be unilaterally abrogated; and 3) t
was not subject to judicial review becaus
trine. It warrants some historical analysi
discussion and because of its continuing u
INDIAN TERRITORY-INDIAN ASSIMILATION

The Kiowa, Comanche, Apaches and several other sou
tribes negotiated a treaty with the federally sponsore

Commission in southern Kansas in 1867.49 This treaty, lik
that era, contained a specific clause regarding future Indian
Article 12 said that: "No treaty for the cession of any portion
reservation herein described, which may be held in comm

any validity or force as against the said Indians, unless

signed by at least three-fourths of all the adult male Indians

same .... .50 Such a provision was intended to ease the c

Indians that federal representatives might in the future seek
of Indian lands by manipulating a minority of the tribal me

Gradually, as more whites settled in Indian Territory

mounted to allot the lands of the tribes. In 1892 the three member

Cherokee Commission (also known as the Jerome Commission), despite
resistance by the Indians, concluded an allotment and land cession agree
ment with certain representatives of the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache
(KCA) tribes. Although the commissioners secured a number of Indian
signatures, the three-fourths provision was not met. Nevertheless, the con
troversial agreement was rushed to Washington, D.C. for congressional

ratification.

Almost immediately, over 300 KCA tribal members memorialized
the Senate urging that body to disapprove the 1892 agreement because 1)
the negotiating sessions had not been conducted in open council or with
the knowledge of tribal leaders and 2) because many of the signatures had
been obtained through misrepresentations, threats, and fraudulent means.
Tribal consent, in other words, of the requisite number of Indians, had
never been legitimately secured.
More importantly, as the agreement wound its way through the congressional ratification process, a journey that took eight years to complete,
Congress substantially revised the agreement prior to its enactment. These
revisions were never submitted to the KCA tribes for their approval, as
required by treaty provision. Nevertheless, on June 6, 1900, Congress ratified the amended agreement.

Lone Wolf, also known as A-Kei-Quodle, was a principal chief of
49. 15 Stat., 581. For good discussion of the treaty proceedings see Douglas C. Jones,

The Treaty of Medicine Lodge: The Story of the Great Treaty Council as Told by

Eyewitnesses (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1966).
50. 15 Stat., 581.
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the Kiowa Nation, and he, along with several Comanche a

leaders, brought suit against the U.S. challenging the legality o
actions. Lone Wolf sought a permanent injunction against con
ratification of the 1900 agreement which allotted the KCA tri
loss of over 2 million acres in Indian Territory, and contend
federal government had directly violated Article 12 of the 1867

Lone Wolf, supported and represented by the Philadel
Indian Rights Association, filed suit in the District of C
Supreme Court in 1901. He lost and had his appeal rejected by
Court of Appeals. The KCA then turned to the U.S. Supreme

justice. The Indians' hopes, however, and by implication,

tribes with treaty-based property rights, were crushed unanim
Court's ruling in 1903.
THE SUPREME MERGER:

IMPLIED PLENARY POWER AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS

Justice Edward D. White issued the opinion which was, shortly after
its pronouncement, labeled by one startled U.S. Senator, Matthew Quey
(R., Pennsylvania), the "Dred Scott decision No. 2 except that in this cas
the victim is red instead of black. It practically inculcates the doctrine tha
the red man has no rights which the white man is bound to respect, and,
that no treaty or contract made with him is binding."51

The Court's unanimous opinion represented a perfect and crippling
synthesis of the plenary power concept and the political question doctrine
The Court refused to even consider the tribes' core argument, that of
"fraudulent misrepresentation" by government officials in securing Indian
signatures. The justices also refused to consider the issue of the Senate's
unilateral alteration of the 1892 agreement's provisions.
The only question the Court considered was whether the Act of June
6, 1900, was constitutional. Despite Lone Wolf's treaty and constitutiona
arguments, Justice White accepted the government attorneys' view tha
since Indians were "wards" their treaty-defined property rights had no
vested. The Indians' claim, said White, "in effect ignores the status of th
contracting Indians and the relation of dependency they bore and continu
to bear toward the government of the United States."52 White was retroac
tively bestowing wardship status on the tribes to make the abrogation of
their treaty rights appear legal.
In discussing congressional plenary power, White stated that: "To
uphold the claim [of the Indians'] would be to adjudge that the indirect
operation of the treaty was to materially limit and quality the controllin
authority of Congress in respect to the care and protection of the Indians

and to deprive Congress, in a possible emergency, when the necessit
51. U.S. Congressional Record (1903): p. 2028.
52. 187 U.S. 553, 564.
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might be urgent for a partition and di

power to act, if the assent of the In

However, there was clearly no "emerge
tion. The congressional ratification pro
taken a full eight years to complete.

The Court's discussion of Congress

tribal rights and resources is of special
After citing previous cases in which th
with fee-simple title, White set up a sit

cumvent these prior opinions He said

there involved a controversy between In
ing the power of Congress to administ
This is correct, as written. Prior to this
acknowledged that it had no right to c
property rights. One of the cases cited
Wetherby,55 had stated that the United S
Indians based on guardianship and that
even though opposed to the strict lette
This "abrogation by implication" argum
assert that congressional "plenary powe

Indians has been exercised by Congre

power has always been deemed a politic

of the judicial department of the governm

White said that Congress "always" had
to judicial review because the Court wa
gressionally directed breakdown of com
the Court had determined, was essentia
tion could be approximated by Indians.
abrogation of treaty rights, notwithsta
lated concerns about lost land, lost righ
dent in the following passage where Wh
breakup of Indian communal lands into
"a mere change in the form of investm
property of those who, as we have held
wards of the government."58

Finally, the Court attempted to lessen

Congress' power to bludgeon treaty-

caused by stating that the government's
people in their treatment of an ignoran
Congress, the Court was presuming, w
53. Ibid.

54. Ibid., p. 565.

55. 95 U.S. 517 (1877).
56. 187 U.S. 565.
57. Ibid.

58. Ibid., p. 568.
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with the Indians and was using its "best judgment in the premises
Court had to "presume" that Congress had acted in good faith in
with the tribes because subsequent to the treaties' ratification it co

no historical or legal assurance to show that Congress had "in

acted in good faith.
The court's use of the implied repeal doctrine, or the closely r
term, "implicit divestiture,"60 has increased since the mid- 1970s in
al cases such as Decoteau v. District Court,61 Rosebud Sioux v. Kn
U.S. v. Dion,63 Oregon Department of Fish & Wildlife v. Klamath
Tribe,64 South Dakota v. Bourland,65 and Hagen v. Utah.66 The in
use of the doctrine may be attributed to the Supreme Court's ide
turn towards a radical brand of conservatism combined with a resu
of states' rights. Recently, the court frequently has favored states
as being superior to Indian treaty rights.67
PRECEDENT AGAINST IMPLIED REPEALS

In 1880 a federal district court in United States v. Berry
an Indian treaty "by its terms was to be permanent, and th
ferred thereby were not to be taken away without the con
Indian." While conceding that congress had the power of rep

said "it is clear to my mind that such repeal can only b

expressed terms, or by such language as imports a clear pu
part of congress to effect that end."

In 1883 the Supreme Court turned its attention to the
implied repeals in the important Indian criminal law case E
Dog.69 In Crow Dog the Supreme Court unanimously held t
59. Ibid.

60. The related phrase that tribes were "implicitly divested" of certain sovereign powers
by their geographic incorporation and allegedly dependent relationship to the federal govern-

ment was developed by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Oliphant v. Suquamish, 435 U.S. 191
(1978).
61. 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
62. 430 U.S. 584 (1977).
63. 106 S.Ct. 2216 (1986).
64. 473 U.S. 753 (1985).
65. 113 S.Ct. 2309 (1993).
66. 1145 S.Ct. 958 (1994).

67. See, for example, Cotton Petroleum Corporation v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163

(1989); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S
408 (1989); County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); and
Strate v. A-] Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997). However, in the spring of 1999 the Supreme
Court rendered two decisions that effectively reaffirmed Indian treaty rights against states'

rights: Minnesota v. Mille Lac Band of Chippewa Indians, 119 S.Ct. 1187 and Puget Sound
Shellfish Growers v. United States, 1999 U.S. Lexis, 2504.
68. 4 Fed. 779 (D.C. Colo. 1880).
69. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
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tribe's remaining sovereign powers was e
over its own members. The government,
for the killing of another Sioux, Spotted T
nal jurisdiction based on articles 1, 2, and
the U.S., which dealt with the establishm
reservation, and the agent's appointment,
government's 1877 agreement with the S
Congress shall, by appropriate legislation,
ernment; they shall be subject to the law

shall be protected in his rights of property

The court disagreed, citing the fact th
Statutes, which excluded from the jurisd
in Indian Country by one Indian against a
repealed. The Sioux Nation's right of selfnecessarily entailed "the regulation by t
affairs, [including] the maintenance of o
members by the administration of their o
Important for our purposes is the cou
implied repeal doctrine, which Justice M
emphatically rebuffed:

It must be remembered that the question before u

[section] 2146 of the Revised Statutes, which ex
the United States the case of a crime committe

Indian against the person or property of another
it is in force and applies to the present case. The
and act of Congress of 1877, it is admitted, do no
What we have said is sufficient at least to show t

necessary implication ... Implied repeals are not
be necessary. There must be a positive repugnanc
new laws and those of the old.72 (emphasis added

Justice Matthews then elaborated on the
and express rights are not to be interpre
acts unless there is explicit reference to th

The language of the exception is special and ex

repeal are general and inconclusive. The rule

derogant. 'The general principle to be applied,' ...
Parliament is that a general act is not to be const
lar act, unless there is some express reference to

subject, or unless there is a necessary inconsis
together.' 'And the reason is,' . . .'that the legi
directed to a special subject, and having observ

case and provided for them, does not intend by a
derogate from its own act when it makes no spec

do.'73 [emphasis his]

70. Ibid., p. 568.
71. Ibid.

72. Ibid., p. 570.
73. Ibid., p. 571.
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More recently, the Supreme Court has insisted in several

cases, Menominee Tribe v. U.S.,74 Washington v. Fishing Vessel

Association,75 and Minnesota v. Mille Lac Band of Chippewa,76 that the
government's intent to abrogate Indian treaty provisions must be clear and

unequivocal. This "clear and plain" standard also applies to non-treaty

situations if the federal action threatens tribal rights created via statute,
aboriginal title, or executive orders.77
There have actually been very few cases where the U.S. Congress or
the President officially78 exercised the power legislatively or administratively to abrogate treaties-Indian or international. The procedure, either

an act of Congress, or some form of direct presidential action, like a
proclamation, must be quite explicit. The following are two examples of
official international treaty abrogation.
EXPRESS REPEALS OF FOREIGN TREATIES

First, on July 7, 1798, Congress enacted a law that directly ab
treaties between the United States and France. The law was entitl
act to declare the treaties heretofore concluded with France, no

obligatory on the U.S." Congress declared that "whereas the tre
cluded between the United States and France have been repeatedly
74. 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
75. 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
76. 119 S.Ct. 1187 (1999).

77. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Hualpai Indians v. Sante Fe Pacific Railroad, 31
(1941) and Bryan v. Itasca Co., 426 U.S. 373 (1976).

78. That is not to say that many treaties or provisions of specific treaties have
"unofficially" violated. It is a well known fact that the federal government h
occasions acted to abrogate or diminish the rights of other nations, including tri

by either not ratifying previously negotiated treaties (e.g., the 18 treaties negotia
the federal government and various California tribes); or by failing to enact nece
lation to implement particular treaty provisions; or by failing to carry out treat
(e.g., fishing rights of Washington, Oregon, and Wisconsin tribal members); or b
later laws which implicitly overrode earlier treaty rights (Kiowa, Comanche, and

Oklahoma).
As regards Indian treaties, Vine Deloria, in response to a query by Senator Dani

in 1987, on whether any Indian treaties had not been violated, said "there are tech
neys' interpretations which is that various articles are specifically violated. I think
of all the treaties or the pledge of good faith between Indians and the U.S.-tha

certainly long since been destroyed" (U.S. Senate. Hearing Before the Select Co
Indian Affairs, on S. Concurrent Resolution 76. 100th Congress., 1st sess., (W
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1988): 29.

Regarding U.S. violations of foreign treaties, see Christopher Joyner's

"International Law" in Peter Schraeder, Intervention into the 1990s: U.S. Foreig

the Third World (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1992): 229-244, i

details how the U.S. has intervened in the affairs of many Third World countrie
avowed support of the doctrine of non-intervention. Examples include U.S. inter
Guatemala in 1954, Cuba in 1961, the Dominican Republic in 1965, Chile in 197

in 1983, and Panama in 1989. Joyner shows how between 1900 and 1930 the

vened militarily on some 60 occasions in several Caribbean and Central American
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ed on the part of the French government
ty of the French government, there is y
States, a system of predatory violence, in
hostile to the rights of a free and indepen
"the United States are of right freed and e
of the treaties, and of the consular conven
not henceforth be regarded as legally oblig

izens of the United States."79

Second, in 1978 President Jimmy Carter terminated a Mutual
Defense treaty with Taiwan. The Senate considered a resolution that
would have required the approval of the Senate or both houses of
Congress before the President could terminate any defense treaty, but

final action was never taken on the measure. A federal district court in

1979 in Goldwater v. Carter,80 held that some form of congressional concurrence was required before the abrogation of a treaty, but this was overturned by an appellate court ruling,81 which was then affirmed late in
1979 by the Supreme Court82 because of Congress' failure to confront the
President directly. The Supreme Court, in fact, split along several lines,
thus providing no clear consensus on future treaty terminations by the
chief executive. Moreover, Congress has not yet enacted legislation defining appropriate rules for the executive and legislature on this matter.83
EXPRESS CONGRESSIONAL REPEAL OF INDIAN TREATIES

Not since the end of the Nineteenth century, when Congress
tively usurped the presidential treaty-making power insofar as
treaties were concerned by terminating the federal government's
ued negotiation of any additional Indian treaties,84 have Americ
79. 2 St. 578.

80. 481 F.Supp. 949, 963-64.
81. 617 F.2d 697 (1979).
82. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).

83. Louis Fisher, Constitutional Structures: Separated Powers & Federalism, vol. I (Ne
York: McGraw Hill, 1990): 309.

84. See, the Indian treaty-termination rider attached to the 1871 Indian Appropriati

Act, which declared that "hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the U
shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom
the U.S. may contract by treaty. This measure, however, recognized the ongoing validity
previously ratified Indian treaties (16 St. 544, 566).

Consult Francis P. Prucha's, American Indian Treaties (Berkeley, CA: University

California Press, 1995) for detailed examination of this intense and critical period. And se

George W. Rice, "Indian Rights: 25 U.S.C. Sec. 77: the End of Sovereignty or a Sel
Limitation of Contractual Ability?" American Indian Law Review, vol. 5 (1977): 239-2

who persuasively argues that Congress' action ending treaty making with tribes is of que
tionable constitutionality. More importantly, the practice of treaty making, though term

agreements, continued from 1872 to 1914. The only difference between the two is t

agreements require ratification by both Houses, while treaties need only be ratified by th

Senate.

This content downloaded from 141.166.178.205 on Tue, 03 Dec 2019 19:43:31 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

20 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY Vol. XLIII

dents had a significant role in Indian treaty (or agreement) nego

interpretation. And as a result of the recent supreme court
Minnesota v. Mille Lac Band of Chippewa Indians (119 S.Ct

(1999), it is clear that the president lacks the power via executive
revoke preexisting Indian treaty rights. Thus my primary focus
explicit Indian treaty abrogation is concerned is on the process
Congress expressly to terminate Indian treaties.
The most vivid and direct congressional action abrogating a
treaty occurred as a result of the outbreak of war between the
Sioux and white settlers in Minnesota in 1862. Several hundred whites

were killed by Sioux who rose up in arms after having been deprived of

their lifestyle and some of their treaty entitlements by government
agents.85 The U.S. Army responded quickly, and soon the Santee were

defeated. General Henry Sibley, the militia commander in Minnesota and
a prominent political figure in the state, ordered a court martial for several

hundred of the Sioux. Three hundred Santee were sentenced to hang,
regardless of their level of involvement in the outbreak of violence.

President Lincoln, however, commuted the death sentences of all but 40
of the Indians. Eventually, 38 were hanged-the largest mass execution in
U.S. history.
Congress responded to the eruption by enacting a law on July 5,
1862, which said that "whenever the tribal organization of any Indian
tribe is in actual hostility to the United States, the President is authorized,
by proclamation, to declare all treaties with such tribe abrogated by such
tribe, if in his opinion the same can be done consistently with good faith
and legal and national obligations."86 In what Francis Prucha called "an

unprecedented move," Congress canceled certain provisions of earlier

treaties with the Sioux and the following year, February 16, 1863, enacted

a law declaring that "all treaties with the Sisseton," and several other
bands of Sioux, were "abrogated and annulled, so far as said treaties or

any of them purport to impose any future obligation on the United

States."87

In a second example, Congress explicitly abrogated a preexisting
Indian treaty right with an act passed February 28, 1877, which also

involved the Sioux. In this act, which ratified an agreement with some
Sioux bands and the Northern Arapaho and Cheyenne, Congress clearly
and unequivocally abrogated Article 16 of the 1868 Sioux treaty, which
had guaranteed the Sioux unceded territory, permitted no whites in their
borders without tribal consent, and required the U.S. to abandon all military posts and close roads. Congress succinctly said: "And Article 16 of
the said treaty is hereby abrogated."

Finally, in 1895 Congress acted to "annul" and "disapprove" a

85. Edward Lazarus, Black Hills/White Justice (New York: Harper Collins Publishers,
1991): 27-28.
86. 12 St. 528.

87. 12 St. 652-54.
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November 13, 1888 treaty (Congress in th
agreement88 as a treaty, not an agreemen
with the Southern Utes of Colorado in fav

treaty made with the tribe which called fo
This act also contained a consent provisio
that the act would be inoperative until it w

adult male Indians on the reservation.

In short, when the federal government determines officially to abrogate an Indian treaty or specific provisions of a treaty, it acts invariably

through the Congress which is authorized to oversee federal Indian

affairs. The legislature exercises this power openly and unambiguously,
and usually only after the legislature has determined that the tribe in question has somehow engaged in an act or a set of actions that warrants the
termination of the specific treaty (e.g., the Santee eruption against local
settlers, which was deemed a violation of their treaty agreement with the

federal government not to engage in hostilities toward neighboring
whites).
EXPRESS CONGRESSIONAL MODIFICATION OF PRIOR
TREATIES/AGREEMENTS

On other specific occasions when Congress has sought to
amend existing Indian treaties or agreements, it has also act
cally by enacting specific laws which have adjusted or amend
ous negotiated arrangements.
Gradually, by the late 1860s, the United States began to a
provisions to many Indian treaties which guaranteed to the t

pants that there would be no cession of reservation land

express written consent of a majority (usually three-fourth
males.90 We have already discussed how in certain cases, mo
the 1867 Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache treaty provision wh
in the devastating Lone Wolf precedent, that this consent p
sometimes brushed aside or abused by federal officials.
Notwithstanding this important case and its bleak prece
are many other instances where the Congress acted to secur
sent before moving to acquire Indian lands or terminate spe
rights, or by acting only after it had passed an express act w
effect of modifying or amending a prior treaty or agreement.

For example, on June 30, 1864,91 Congress enacted a

88. This is technically what all bilateral negotiations between tribes and
termed after the 1871 treaty termination law.
89. 28 St. 677.

90. See, e.g., Article 8 of the 1868 treaty between the Northern Cheyenne, Northe
Arapahoe and the United States (15 Stat., 655); and Article 10 of the 1868 Navajo Tre

with the United States (15 Stat., 667).
91. 13 Stat., 324.
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authorized the president to negotiate with the Confederated T
Oregon in an effort to have them relinquish certain off-reserva
ing, fishing, and gathering rights the tribes had retained in an
The president was authorized by Congress to defray the expen
treaty negotiations and to offer the tribes $5,000 for cession
rights.

In 1872, Congress passed an act92 to implement certain provisions of

the 1866 Cherokee Treaty having to do with the so-called "Cherokee
Strip" lands owned by the Cherokee Nation in Kansas. Those lands were
to be surveyed and sold but only after the sale had been approved by the
Cherokee National Council or by a duly authorized Cherokee delegation.

In yet another example, Congress passed a measure in 187493 dealing
with the federal government's efforts to fulfill the eighth article of the
treaty between the Creek and Seminole Indians which had been concluded
in 1856. Article 8 authorized the federal government to expend $5,000
annually for the "comfort, civilization, and improvement" of the Indians.
However, in a proviso, Congress states that "the consent of said tribe to
such expenditures and payment shall be first obtained."
The Osage Tribe also received congressional assurances94 that their
consent would be obtained before their Kansas lands, known as the Osage
Indian trust and diminished reserved lands, were sold at public auction to
the highest bidder. These sales were not to occur "until at least two-thirds
of the adult males" agreed to the provisions outlined by Congress.
Francis P. Prucha claims that "Indian consent, however, gradually
disappeared as a major element" of federal Indian policy after the 1880s,
largely as a result of the force of the February 8, 1887 General Allotment
Act95 which was the policy directive issued by Congress to hasten the
individualization of Indian communal land through the allotment of individual shares to Indian families and members. On a broad level, he is

essentially correct because there is significant evidence that many tribes

fought valiantly-and never gave their consent freely-to avoid the

breakdown of their cultures and the erosion of their land bases, only to
have the federal government push ahead and proceed with detribalization

and allotment.

Nevertheless, while federal pursuit of American Indian assimilation
was an overwhelming force from which tribes could not extricate themselves, one still finds clear examples where Congress persisted in obtaining tribal consent before enforcing or implementing agreement provisions,
or, at the least, Congress, before modifying treaties or agreements, would
pass subsequent acts to carry out their purpose.
For instance, on July 1, 1902, Congress passed an act to accept, ratify, and confirm the allotment agreement and memorial that had been pro92. 17 Stat., 98.
93. 18 Stat., 29.
94. 21 Stat., 509.

95. 24 Stat., 388.
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posed by the Kansas or Kaw Tribe of O
contained the consent provision: "The s
memorialize Congress to ratify and con
provision for carrying it into effect: Pr
ments are made in this agreement by C
effective until such amendments are ap
members of the . . . tribe. .. ." The Kaw
under enormous pressure to have their
Indian Affairs (CIA), W.A. Jones, state
Kaw agreement: "The agreement is in e
this [CIA] office ... The Indian must ult
resources, and this agreement proposes
The consent provision, however, was de

some assurance that their rights wou

Congress, though it was clear that they
The 1903 Lone Wolf decision had est
in Indian affairs: that Congress could a
treaty rights over the protests of Indi
plenary power over Indian property. An
work, American Indian Treaties, that "
idea of requiring Indian consent for th

largely discarded in regard to statut

Congress unilaterally provided for the
after allotments had been completed."98
Prucha cites as evidence a 1901 agree
for the sale of their unallotted lands in
Inspector, James McLaughlin, properly
fourths of the adult Sioux males for th
however, was later amended and ratifi

that eliminated the requirement to s

Committee on Indian Affairs which m
which called for the elimination of the
their action largely on the basis of the L
Although it is true that Congress less
consent before allotting Indian reserva

left after allotment, the fact remains tha
still had to formally act when it voted o

fied prior Indian treaties or agreement
point quite clearly. On June 11, 1934, e
96. 32 Stat., 636.

97. U.S. Congress. House. "Agreement and Mem
Oklahoma." Document No. 452, 57th Cong., 1st
Government Printing Office, 1903): 3.

98. Francis P. Prucha, American Indian Treatie
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994):
99. Ibid., p. 357.
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prehensive Indian reform measure, the Indian Reorganizati

which helped to revitalize tribes economically, politically, and c
Congress enacted an act101 "to modify the effect of certain C

Indian treaties . . ." and expressly amended article 7 of two

treaties-February 22, 1853 and September 30, 1854-which cent
jurisdictional purposes on defining what was "Indian Country."
important point is that this modification of treaty rights req
express and unequivocal statement by the Congress which had f
tiated and ratified the original treaties.

The data show, therefore, that on these occasions when the
has officially acted to expressly abrogate or modify indigenous
has done so by formally acting through the legislative process
times sought tribal consent before changing the treaty/agreem
commentators and ample litigation confirm that Congress may
deemed extremely important or vital to the national interest, e
cise law abrogating (or amending) a prior treaty (agreement) o

(agreement) provision. Officially, the power to unilaterally

Indian treaties has not been wielded often. This is because, as
General Caleb Cushing noted in 1854 in an opinion on the land
several Kansas Territory tribes:

Let me not be understood as acceding to the doctrine, that all stipulat
treaties are subject to be repealed or modified at any time by act of Con

Without going into that question here, it suffices to remark that every treaty
express compact, in the most solemn form in which the United States can m

compact. Not to observe a treaty, is to violate a deliberate and express e

ment. To violate such engagements of a treaty with any foreign power affo
course, good cause of war.102

Cushing went on to note, however, that there were some im
distinctions between Indian treaties and treaties with foreign n
he observed, "[e]xamples may be cited of acts of Congress, whic
so as to modify or amend treaties with Indians. As their sove
their guardian, we have occasionally assumed to do this, actin
interest and our own, and not, in such cases, violating engagem
them, but seeking to give a more beneficial effect to such en

For though they be weak, and we strong,-they subjects an

ters,-yet they are not the less entitled to the exercise towards t
most scrupulous good faith on the part of the United States."10
words, the federal government was legally and morally bound
Indian treaties not only because they were important political c
but also because of the added trust/moral dimension: the feder
ment, in asserting its physical superiority, had an additional set
sibilities to protect the lands and interests of Indians.
100. 48 Stat., 984.
101. 48 Stat., 927.

102. U.S. Official Opinions of the Attorneys General of the United St
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1854): 663-64.

103. Ibid., p. 664.
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The treaty power, as Attorney Gene

1870, "binding the will of the nation, mu

be paramount to the legislative power
course, after a time, declined and in som
wage war by negotiating many treaties
they reluctantly agreed to reduced lan
United States in exchange for continued

and all other reserved rights. Hence,

important distinctions between U.S. tre
treaties with indigenous powers (their g
and declared trust and plenary doctrine
must not be assumed that these differ
bility of the documents. As a federal c
Baptist Missionary Union,105 "it is con
tribes, has not the same dignity or effe
independent nation. This distinction is n
... They are treaties, within the meaning
are the supreme laws of the land" (p. 34
CONCLUSION

I have argued that the Supreme Court lacks constitutional a
to abrogate specific treaty rights by implication or to divest In
of their rights; such power is constitutionally vested and on a
sions has been expressly wielded by the U.S. Congress. From a
nous perspective, corroborated by a plethora of federal policy
opinions, and some historical practice, the Supreme Court's de
The Kansas Indians,106 contains the most reasonable articulation
Indian treaties/agreements may be changed. The Court held th
treaties and the rights affirmed or created by treaty provisio
modified, amended, or terminated only as a result of bilateral tr
lations, purchase, or the voluntary abandonment of the tribal or
The evidence shows that the United States on a number of occasions

mutually agreed to modify or amend treaties and sought on some occasions to purchase Indian treaty rights. And while congressional power
over tribal lands and rights was far more oppressive after the Lone Wolf
decision, since Congress regularly acted as if tribal consent was no longer
required, it was still federal policy that changes in treaty/agreement rights

required the enactment of congressional statutes with exact language
specifying which treaty provision was to be modified or eliminated.

The specification of how treaty rights could be changed to allow
both parties to remain within the paradigm of good faith is found in language of the federal district court ruling in the important water rights case,
104. Ibid., vol. 13 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1873): 358.

105. 24 Fed.Cas. 344 (1852).
106. 72 U.S. 737 (1866).
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Winters v. United States,107 in which Judge Hawley said, "We mu
sume that the government and the Indian, in agreeing to the term
treaty, acted in the utmost good faith toward each other; that the
understood its meaning, purpose, and object."los
In other words, the political/moral principle of "utmost good
when combined with the trust doctrine, requires that both parties
fulfill not only the letter but especially the spirit of the treaties neg
In the event that there is to be a modification or abrogation of th
arrangement, it is to be carried out mutually, consensually, and vol
through the same political/diplomatic channels that led to the trea
ation in the first instance. On those few occasions when the feder
ernment has acted formally to abrogate treaties or provisions of t
Congress has wielded the abrogating power, but even then only t
the express wording in a statute. And in the more numerous case
Congress negotiated agreements and then sought to modify or am
them, it also passed specific legislation identifying what its intenti
and frequently sought Indian consent to concur with the change.
It is not the province of the Supreme Court to generate a con
sional intent and then to unilaterally or by implication repeal sp
treaty rights that have been negotiated and ratified through politic
nels by tribal nations and their political leaders and the U.S. gove
and its political leaders. Indian treaties, ultimately, are vital dipl
arrangements between nations. And while they may be abrogated
Congress (and the tribes, for that matter), depending on the conflu
particular if ill-defined circumstances, because of the distinctive tr
good faith doctrines, and exclusive authority of Congress with reg
Indian affairs, there must be a clear and specific intent to abrogat
must be carried out by those political branches which oversee the
States relationship with tribes. When alleged conflicts erupt betwe
cific Indian treaty provisions and later congressional or state statu
principal task of the Supreme Court must be to uphold the honor
of the nation, as outlined in the treaty, and interpret the conflicting
in a way that conforms to the national will and the federal govern
trust obligations to tribes.

107. 143 Fed. Reporter 740 (1906).
108. Ibid., p. 745.
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